CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAMITY INFORMATION RELEASE AS SANITIZED



了787 DISPATCH NO. L

CLASSIFICATION

: Chief, WHD

DATE:

25 June 1952

FROM

: Chief of Station, C

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SUBJECT: GENERAL-

DYCLUCK

' SPECIFIC-

TP-REDUCE

Reference- 732; 7596 and 600; WASH 46723, 46792, 46852

- 1. Attached are copies of an undated communication from KMEGGCUP received via the subject of [] 758 and [] on 20 June 1952; a copy of the reply thereto dated 22 June; and KMEGGCUP's response which was received on 24 June.
- 2. It is, of course, realized that KMEGGCUP and his group are operating under very difficult circumstances at the present time, although none of the group is known to have been arrested by the Government. Numerous arrests have been made of the anti-Communist students.

Anti-Communism at the present time is widespread throughout the country. The Army, however, insofar as we know has not shown definite signs of revolting. There have been intimations publicly and even by the President in his speech on the night of 20 June that anti-Communist elements have been in contact with and endeavoring to influence with money Army officers to revolt.

- 3. While KMEGGCUP indicates a belief that the situation is ripe for a movement, we must not overlook the fact that anti-Communism is now a basic factor in the social and political life of the country. It is not believed that the Government officials can further their present pro-Communist line without having the issues created thereby coupled with the economic situation bring about an eventual downfall of the Government.
- 4. Summaries of information contained herein were supplied in []596 and 600.

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CLASSIFICATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 51-28A

Etanilar minesti kilji prih pilikitiliji prih



In regard to our last note, situation has changed considerably. Things may happen any moment. I have changed my request made in the other note, as a considerable amount of elements wanted are avilable now. What we need now is raising one hundred grand and we have only one half. Your help would be to tell what would be the best offer we can get from you to fill the rest. We would need that quickly, before monday if possible.

There is also another thing. We would need help from outside in the wright moment. Could you have some flying boats come with more elements that may be landed here at a place we would advise? i.e., that your job would be to have this boats ready with the best elements you could obtain, to be used within six hours at the most.

About paragraph No. 1. that is most important. The other part would be of secondary importance, because we can go ahead anyway the way we are now, but we need the dough.





June 22,1952

At present we have no idea of how the type of boats you mentioned could be gotten or how they are to be used. We are very doubtful that anything could be worked out along that line unless we can get sufficiently in advance details as to how, when and where they are to be used, how many men and the quantity and kind of arms they should have, and specifically what they are to do. Unless we get such detailed information we feel certain we cannot help in that line.

In the matter of money there is a possibility, but it will take a few days for us to get it. We realize that you need it quickly, but we just do not have enough information to convince our people that your efforts will be successful if a large sum is given to you. You, of course, recognize that you are speaking in relatively large sums. We realize that large sums may be necessary; at the same time you have given us no information as to how the funds will be used, and our people are hard headed businessmen who don't just turn their money loose without some kind of assurances that the money will be well spent.

We realize that you are naturally very cautious about whom you give the information to and want to be sure that in giving any information you will not be embarrassed and that no one will use it to interfere with your efforts. It is simply a matter of confidence. Our people, before they will release any large sum of money, will have to be convinced that it will be well spent, and we cannot convince them without more information. We might be able to get a substantial sum that will go a long way toward filling your needs, but you will have to have confidence in us and give us considerable information concerning how such funds and those you already have will be used. We feel quite sure that we will not be able to raise a substantial sum for you without the information.

1. Please give us a detailed plan of accomplishing your purpose.

2. Why do you think such a plan will work?

Is it a coup d'etat or a general revolt in various parts of the country with a view toward eventually forcing out the present officials?

Do you have any pledges from military officers?

5. Are you confident that they will perform their agreed upon actions? Are they in sufficiently high positions and do they carry sufficient

weight with the people and with the Army to command respect which will serve to stabilize matters for a reasonable length of time?

Is it planned to have a junta in the Government consisting exclusively of military officers, or will it have both military and civilians?

You mention that you have a considerable amount of "elements" or at least that such are available to you. Do you mean arms and ammunition, or do you mean people who are willing to fight, or both? Where are such resources? Are they ready to move?

Do you have assistance in men and materials in neighboring countries?

If so, where, how many and how much?

Do you intend to use the funds to pay any military officers in order that they will have adequate funds in any eventuality, that is, either success of failure? If so, what assurances do you or will you have that they will comply with their promises?





Please believe us when we tell you that you will not be embarrassed in any way by giving us full and complete information along the lines indicated. You have been dealing with us for some time now, and you have not been embarrassed, and regardless of what happens we assure you that no embarrassment will result from your having given us complete, detailed information.

There are two reasons why we have not been able to act as promptly and as fully as we would like to: We have not had enough information concerning your plans and the possibility that they could be and would be fully executed. If you could keep us informed on such matters we could keep ourselves in a better position to act promptly to meet your needs. The second reason is that we feel, and we are sure you agree, the most important fact is keeping our communications channels secure. This sometimes makes our communications somewhat slow. We are taking every possible step to minimize delays.



The way things are now is as follows:

We have the opportunity to obtain for \$50,000 arms and ammunition in good condition (new) enough to arm 650 men with sufficient strength to start with good results an armed revolt. This would be done in the city, in a very daring coup comprising several important points, military and government points in a detailed manner we have already prepared. This would be done during certain part of the day. At the high officials, there would be no governsame time, once eliminated ment left to obey and at that time we know that we can secure some army officers that could give us help. That is where one part of the money can come in, for we would attack the forts but would be able to offer the alternative of giving a certain amount of money to the man in charge. The way we plan the attack gives us a very good chance of success. The arms are good enough to fight these military men. It comprises a lot of 180 machineguns of three different calibers, and 500 automatic rifles and ammunition about 600,000 cartridges per man. There are also 500 hand grenades. What we need and are lacking now is tear gas bombs. This is very important and maybe you could secure some.

The guns and ammunition we mention are already "within the city limits" and we can get them in 24 hours provided we have the money. The person dealing with us in this matter is the utmost confidence and is giving us a property in guarantee for the same amount of fifty grand. It is a property worth more than that. It belongs to him. Besides, in order to be sure that we got the arms and ammunition in good condition and in the form we have planned, we would keep the men that come to get the dough, uncontrol for 48 hours, until we have duly received the merchandise to our satisfaction.

As far as the boats I mentioned in the last note, that means that we would have an airport in hour hands—the place can be told you in the wright moment—and we would need, flamethrowers, automatic arms, machine guns and best arms you could get. This would be to support our movement after fighting has started. The airforce has at present only four planes that can operate but that is almost no danger as they are old and don't have enough to resist. We do not need men as we have enough people here There people are not officers in active duty. They are people that knows well about arms as they have been in the armed forces before. We have prepared about 400 men which are ready to act within a very short notice. Of course these men do not know anything else but that they are about to enter in action. Most of these men will have to be paid for their expenses once you put them active. That is where we need parts of the money.

Besides this movement, we have already prepared a group of professional gummen that easily can eliminate some of the best commies and control the unions which are well armed. These men can work for \$2,000 per head and we will pay them after the job is done. Not in advance. The only condition would be to get them the dough in cash, american money. Once we put the plan in operation, this part would be made timed and adjusted in a way that both things would go together.

Your questions are answered like this: 1.—datelines are given above. 2.—because of the daring way this is to be done and because of the effective points we would destroy we could have all the government disorganized in about six hours of fighting. 3.—it can be considered as a coup detat but we can also produce some revolts in the interior if we find it necessary to attract the government attention. 4.—we do not have pledges made in advance but think it is possible to make them at the last minute in

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the way explained above. You cannot trust any of the guys in active service now. 5.—answered in point four. 6.—same as No. 5.4.7.—the best way to act would be to have a Junta including civilians and military men. This has not been discussed definitely yet. 8.—the elements mentioned previously are the arms and ammunition. 9.—We do not, although I know of a group that has been working about that and we could get their support if we could interest them in the pricese moment. 10.—the funds would be used as follows: 50,000 to obtain the elements. 20,000 for the elimination of the big shots (commies). The rest would be to have on hand for other expenses connected with this, as salaries, foodstuffs and other emergencies, including the possibility of giving parts of the money to an army officer in the wright moment. There is one thing I would like to say. In these cases you can never be sure of the success, that is one hundred per cent, but I should say that if we operate within a short period of time we can have a chance maybe as good as fifty fifty. We intend to operate, if possible, within a fortnight.

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